Statistical Controls and the Regulation of Air Cargo by Feldstein, Marc J.




STATISTICS AS A REGULATORY DEVICE
The functioning of a regulatory agency is increasingly dependent upon adequate
statistical work by its staff. The broad trend of social and economic legislation
which was gaining momentum since the last quarter of the nineteenth century re-
quired factual information regarding economic problems. Economics was emerg-
ing from the era of descriptive "philosophic" essays into the "scientifically" objective
era of quantitative studies, with mathematics and statistics becoming the chief tools
of investigation. The quest for facts became a strong drive, permeating practically
all facets of economic legislation. The courts were attuning themselves more and
more to the importance of reliable factual data as the basis for decisions. The
"Brandeis" way of preparation of cases for litigation and of brief-writing took a
strong hold on a substantial proportion of lawyers. The administrators of the numer-
ous regulatory commissions required factual materials as the basis to place their
actions above the level of "capriciousness" and "arbitrariness" on the one hand, and
on the other hand to give their actions the stamp of the new respectability.
Ideally the work of a statistician in a regulatory agency begins when a need has
arisen to find an answer to the question: what is wrong with a given situation-
i.e., definition of the problem situation, its scope and significance. Then follows
the question: what do we need to know to work out some means of solving the
problem-i.e., development of the factual basis of data pertinent to the problem.
Then several alternate plans are formulated and statistics are relied upon to evaluate
the probable end-results of each of the alternative solutions. After the "best" plan
is decided upon, a directive is formulated to put it in operation.. The job of a
statistician up to that point is only half done. The statistician must develop a sys-
tem of continuous check on the working out of that directive, that is, means of con,
tinuous control of the operations under that directive. And finally, he must make
provision for periodic evaluation of the results of operations in terms of their achiev-
ing the desired ends.
The statistician is not a policy maker. He is a tool of an administrator, who in
turn works within the framework of the broad objectives laid down by the specific
organic acts passed by the legislature. At the time organic acts for establishment of
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a given regulatory agency are passed by the legislature, the factual basis is prac-
tically never complete enough to allow the legislators to spell out the details even
if they wanted to do it. Some definite guides, however, to this spelling out are, as
a rule, stated by the legislature
Regulatory agencies are created to cope with the fast-growing facets of our
economy. The statement of policy in the organic act usually includes some broad
provision for use of political judgment---"informed judgment" on the part of the
regulatory agency, such as, for instance, considerations of "public interest" or "public
convenience and necessity." In addition, the legislature not only sets out general
standards but also leaves room for defining by the regulatory agency of adminis-
trative standards which will allow the parties subject to regulation to know in
advance what they can or cannot legitimately do. Such legislative and administrative
standards may be in parts procedural in nature, in parts, substantive and statistical.2
II
TiH GRowm PATrERN OF AIR TRANSPORTATION
The problems in a growing industry change with time. In air transportation
these changes were best characterized by the developmental transition from the sim-
ple formative period of the Thirties to the complex struggles of the late Forties. Dur-
ing the Thirties the major problems of air transportation were the need for expanding
geographically the infant industry, for stabilizing it on sounder financial grounds,
for developing operating patterns, and for experimenting with practically all aspects
of operating routines. There was abundant room for growth and development of
individual carriers. The carriers needed subsidy to get established in the field; they
needed a network of routes; they needed simple regulatory patterns to facilitate
operations; they needed simple guidance. The present pattern of air transportation
in the United States is a result of rapid extension of routes and expansion of car-
riers' systems, which systems grew more or less by their own impetus. The carriers,
in competition with one another, tried to establish and strengthen their strategic
position in the national economy to the best of their abilities. True, there were
checks on these expansions, there were administrative acts and pressures enacted to
channelize their development to serve "public interest" and "public convenience and
necessity," but these checks, administrative acts and pressures, spread over the last
ten years, do not fall into a consistent pattern focused on the development of an
industry
1 it was a failure to spell out sufficiently definite guides, of course, which led to the termination
of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 STAT. 195 (933), as amended.
'Perhaps the most significant administrative standards of this character were those of the Office of
Price Administration. See DAVID F. CAVERS, ET AL., PROBLEMS IN PRICE CONTROL: PRlCIo STANDARDS
(HsTORICAL REPORTS Ox AV ADMINISTRATION, GEN. PuB. No. 7, 1947); NATHANIEL L. NATHANSON AND
HAROLD LEVENTHAL, PROBLEMS IN PRiCE CONTROL: LEGAL PHASES (HISToRIcAL REPORTS ON WAR ADMIN-
ISTRATION, GEN. PUB. No. 11, 1947).
' See Sweeney, Policy Formation by the Civil Aeronautics Board, x6 J. AIR L. AND CoNI. x27, 147
(1949); Westwood, Choice of the Air Carrier for New Air Transport Routes, x6 GEo. WASH. L. REv. s,
X59 (1947-1948).
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Recently new and dynamic factors have entered into the air transportation pic-
ture which profoundly affect regulatory needs. Among these, factors are the post-
war expansion of capacity, the development of new plane types, the challenge of
"air coach" operations from the irregular passenger carriers and from some of the
established carriers as well, increased competition from fellow grandfather carriers,
diminution of the proportion of mail payments in the total revenue of carriers until
recently, and, most of all, the startling rise of the independent all-cargo carriers.
Moreover, the cargo picture is not a simple one in as much as some of the mail-
passenger carriers have transported volume amounts of freight, and in recent months
one such carrier has become the principal mover of this type of traffic.
These facts raise difficult problems with respect to the administration of air mail
subsidies, for which domestically only the certificated passenger carriers are eligible.6
The extent to which these carriers may use funds received from the government to
offset possible losses from air freight remains an unsettled issue. This issue is made
all the more difficult to resolve because of (i) the grandfather carriers' historical
reliance on subsidy and their determined effort to block the determination of "joint
costs," and (2) the fact that competing independent freight carriers have no subsidy
backlog on which to rely. Obviously the second of these factors must and has re-
ceived consideration by the Civil Aeronautics Board, but any final determination
not to consider the over-all financial needs of passenger carriers is a step that may
not be taken lightly.
III
BASIC REPORTING NEEDS7
It is in this context that we face the problem of the statistical needs of the reg-
ulating agency, particularly with respect to the impact made upon the industry by
the growth of air cargo. If at the outset we are to assume that the information
requirements of the agency are now the same simple ones that existed in the
formative period of the Thirties, a subsequent Board attempt to develop a rational
air transport system may well be hindered by its own reporting devices.
The history of CAB statistical procedures has a bearing on the problems now at
hand. Under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, the agency had been granted rather
broad powers to prescribe a reporting system for the carriers. This reporting system
was intended to yield data for the carrying out of regulations. The reporting sys-
'This was emphasized by the Task Force Report on Regulatory Commissions (Appendix N), pre-
pared for the (Hoover) Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, January,
1949, at page 74.
'Recent recurrent monthly reports of the Civil Aeronautics Board show that American Airlines freight
traffic is now greater than that of Slick Airways, the largest of the independent cargo carriers.
'The tentative opinion of the Board in the Air Freight Certificate Case, Docket No. 8io, makes no
provision for subsidy for the independent freight carriers, and none of these carriers has as yet seriously
proposed that subsidy be granted it. Order Serial No. 2759, April 25, 1949.
7 In the following discussion we concern ourselves with the thought patterns underlying the statistical
design of CAB statistics, rather than the details of statistical forms, definitions, etc. Given an adequate
framework, the craftsmanship of a statistician will take care of technical points.
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tern in operation between 1938 and 1946 was adapted from the system for reporting
on mail operations on a post-audit basis employed by the Post Office Department,
which had jurisdiction over air mail. The system centered upon the chief interest
of the Post Office-namely, the cost of carrying mail to be defrayed by the Post
Office. Department. With the mail rates having become the vehicle of underwriting
the operation of the carriers under the Act of 1938, the salient points of the reporting
system did not have to change too much. The determination of the mail rate, based
on the need of the carrier, continued to be the center of emphasis; while the industry
continued in its infancy, the reporting system carried over from the Post Office
appeared to serve reasonably well.
By 1945 its inadequacies became sufficiently pronounced so that a basic revision
and extension of the reporting system was undertaken by the CAB's Bureau of Eco-
nomic Regulation, with the cooperation of a committee appointed by the Air Trans-
port Association of America, the trade organization of the established mail-passenger
carriers. This revision, entitled a "Uniform System of Accounts for Air Carriers"
(Form 41), was put into effect on January x, 1947. It extended the scope of report-
ing, sharpened the definition of accounts, improved substantially the workability of
the system, and made it better adaptable to the needs of the regulatory process. The
exhaustive work on revision of the system was a significant attempt to introduce
uniformity into the reporting of the different carriers, thus making the data in these
reports comparable among the carriers as well as among the different periods. The
reporting system has remained, however, essentially a retrospective post-audit system.
The need for further revision of the reporting system has been voiced by the CAB
staff, and by other agencies concerned with air commerce. But the pressure of other
work and the tremendously time-consuming process of clearance of such a basic
revision delays the undertaking. Meanwhile, the present design is expanded, re-
vised, and made to serve the needs of the CAB as well as it can.
The present reporting system necessarily requires staff work to be conducted
along certain narrow lines. In order to determine the reasonable mail rates for the
future, which are the only kind of worth while "permanent" mail rates prescribed
by the Board, past operations are analyzed to determine if management has been
operating "honestly, economically and efficiently."' Lacking the background of
broad economic analyses and time and motion studies, the CAB staff takes recourse
in the method of comparison between the detailed expenditures of a group of more
or less similar carriers to establish some group norms of "efficiency of operations."
Serious deviations from such group norms may result in disallowances of particular
expenditures for mail rate purposes. These disallowances are intended to protect
the interests of the government by cutting down the extent of subsidy and also to
aid industry in getting on an even keel by attracting attention of the individual
carriers to excessive expenses or inefficient patterns of operation. Projections of these
results and trends based on these post-audits are among the factors used for fixing
future mail rates.
S See Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 336 U. S. 6oi (949).
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Necessarily -a reporting system of this character leads to preoccupation with the
"efficiency" of management. The Board finds itself in this anomalous position:
"efficiency" of a given carrier is ascertained by comparison of its past operating re-
sults with the past results of some comparable carriers. The method of determining
efficiency thus fits snugly into the system of post-audit reporting. But in recent times
the differences in the "efficiency" of carriers' operations were growing smaller, be-
cause of the growing standardization of patterns of operation, thus cutting the
ground from beneath the preoccupation with "efficiency."
Far more attention needs to be directed toward the issue of whether a carrier's
operations are "economical" in the language of Section 4o6(b) of the Civil Aero-
nautics Act.' In one of the most significant addresses of recent years, Chairman
O'Connell has stated the question in this form:'
The words "honest, economical and efficient" as used in Section 4o6(b) are usually
spoken in one breath and it is a little difficult to differentiate between at least the last two.
To my mind, the word "efficiency" represents a concept of output relative to input. This
would be judged primarily by the amount of transportation produced by a given number
of employees, the amount of transportation which can be generated by a given amount
of capital applied to the business, etc. On the other hand, "economical" connotes for me
the questions of whether or not the carrier and the carrier's management arrive at
decisions w4hich make reasonable economic sense. For example, are they offering an
amount of capacity which is based on reasonable levels of demand or are they offering
capacity which is far in excess of that demand. Is their pricing, that is their rates and
fares for the carriage of passengers and property, so designed as to maximize their rev-
enues and their profits or are they established with no clear objective in mind and allowed
to drift along as best they may.
To me the word "economical" implies an ability to plan sufficiently far in advance as
to be prepared to meet the contingencies of botfi operations and traffic at the time that
they may arise, granted, of course, that no forecasting or planning can be perfect. An
economical management is one which would exercise a reasonable care and prudence in
terms of the financial plans that it worked out. These plans should take into considera-
tion the basic nature of air transportation and the possibility, if not probability, that the
industry and the particular carrier concerned will be faced sooner or later with difficult
periods during which the impact of a heavy debt structure and related fixed charges will
be particularly onerous, perhaps crushing.
I am not sure that some of our air carriers have an economic management, using the
term in the sense of the word just discussed....
This indicates at least the position of the present Board Chairman that individual
carriers, in order to satisfy the statutory test of "economical" management, should
formulate long-range plans which recognize the growth and development factors of
their own systems as well as of the industry. But this places no lighter burden on
the Board; on the contrary, this conclusion makes it imperative that the Board
formulate a comprehensive plan for air transportation which would encompass not
) 52 STAT. 998, 49 U. S. C. §486 (1946).
21 Air Mail Pay Under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (an. address before the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, March 23, 1949).
1I
102 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
only the growth and development of each diverse part of the industry but also that
of the industry as an entity.11 Without such a plan, "regulation" in the sense con-
templated by the Civil Aeronautics Act is well nigh impossible.
But the "economical" test is difficult to make with only past results of operations
to examine. Economic planning of future operations is essentially a matter of man-
agerial policies which determine the future operations. It is in this framework that
the desirability for "prospective" reporting, in addition to "retrospective" reporting,
becomes apparent. If it is posited that the operations of a given carrier must be
viewed and analyzed in the context of the entire industry; if the stress in the
evaluation is to be divided between the analysis of the actual operations and that of
managerial policies; and if we are to view air transportation as a genuine "growth
industry" which expands and creates new patterns-that is, such patterns which
cannot be explained merely as expansion or continuation of old patterns-then the
need for prospective reporting and the limitations of post-audit reporting become
obvious.
By prospective reporting is meant the submission of statistical data by the carrier
estimating the salient facts of operations during a future period, say, a year. The
carrier should be required to submit every quarter its estimates for the following
year, correcting them as the need arises. Thus, CAB would have in its files a com-
plete forecast by the carrier of the traffic and cost data; data on equipment and its
utilization; data on financing of operations; and reflection of the effect of handicaps
and atypical situations as they are evaluated and felt at the time of their occurrence
and in successive periods. In contrast, the present reporting system used by CAB
is based squarely on the traditional notions of accounting. When the problems get
out of the rather rigid area of "taxing, credit and legal purposes," 2 and when this
system attempts to meet wider requirements of economic planning and policy mak-
ing, its shortcomings appear.
Prospective reporting will become a definite deterrent to the present widespread
practice of making ad hoc estimates and claims for separate proceedings-estimates
and claims, frequently of a contradictory nature, fitting the carrier's advantage in a
particular proceeding. In addition to this worth while deterrent, prospective report-
ing will allow direct comparison between planned and actual operations, thus raising
danger signs whenever the operations do not work out according to plan. Prospective
reporting greatly facilitates the managerial control of operations and tends to instill
in the management the attitude of critical self-evaluation. It tends to simplify and
make more effective the administrative and regulatory process by supplying crucial
"The Report to Congress on Regulatory Commissions by the (Hoover) Commission on Organization
of the Executive Branch of the Government sets out the following conclusion under the heading What
Is Wrong with Independent Regulatory Commissions:
"The quantity of work in the regulatory field at the top level has been so great that the commis-
sions have often neglected their promotional and planning functions." A REPOrT To TM CONGRESS BY
TH[E COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE ExEcuTIvE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 4 (March, 1949).
" Readers are referred to BILLY E. GoETz, MANAGEMENT, PLANNING AND CONROL (1949), particularly
chapter x2, for a penetrating discussion of the relation of statistics to managerial control.
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data in a timely manner. In the analysis of interaction among carriers in terms of
a comprehensive plan for air transportation, prospective reporting will give the CAB
a means of anticipating difficulties and the need of regulatory oi corrective action,
on a preventive rather than a curative basis. Under present circumstances, the
Board must wait until the problem situations are brought to its attention, thus re-
ducing itself to the position of an umpire rather than that of a planner of air trans-
portation on a national scale.13
The power of CAB to require prospective reporting can hardly be questioned in
principle. The inclusion of some specific details may be objected to by the carriers,
but the substantial advantages which would be derived from instituting the system
of prospective reporting so far outweigh the difficulties of its installation, that one
is surprised that this reporting pattern has not been consistently employed by the
Civil Aeronautics Board.
The changing influence of mail revenues14 and the growing impact of revenues
from cargo have already been suggested. Quite apart from the merits or demerits
of prohibiting the use of subsidy to offset freight losses,' 5 or the extent of that use,
one thing does seem clear. The Board should be sure that the statistical materials
compiled by its staff will squarely face the problem of joint costs and show the cost
of carrying either freight, express, mail, or passengers, for in the absence of quanti-
tative data the decision on the merits otherwise will be made on the basis of con-
jecture and emotion.
Obviously the impact of the air freight "industry" or sub-industry upon air trans-
portation will go far beyond the matter of statistical procedures. It may well be
that one impact will be the realization that the simple ad hoc approach to air trans-
portation problems, perhaps necessary and valuable in an earlier period, has outworn
its usefulness.' This conclusion will be most difficult to escape once it is assumed
that the prime regulatory responsibility is the fitting of diverse parts into a rational
total pattern of air transport. Not only does intelligent administration of air mail
1" See Durham and Feldstein, Regulation as a Tool in the Development of the Air Freight Industry,
34 VA. L. REV. 769, 8o8 (1948); see also Sweeney, Policy Formation by the Civil Aeronautics Board, 16
J. Ant L. AND Com. 127, 147 (949).
"* According to the recent Report on Air Mail Subsidy of the House Committee on Post Office and
Civil Service, mail pay represented 37.8 per cent of all operating revenues in 1938 but only 7.7 per cent
in the first nine months of 1947. H. R. REP. No. 1958, 8oth Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1948). In the case
of five carriers-Braniff, American, Delta, Eastern, and National-the 1947 proportion of revenues from
mail pay was 4 per cent or less. Id. at 41.
"The Task Force Report (Appendix N) on Regulatory Commissions prepared for the (Hoover)
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government took the position that "mail
rates should no longer include any need or subsidy element but should be based on the service rendered.
They should reflect a fair allocation of costs between mail, passenger, and freight services." THE TAsK,
FoRcE RMPoRT (APPENIx N) ON REGULATORY COsMISSIONs 77 (January, 1949).
" The criticism of the (Hoover) Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Gov-
ernment contained in the report on the regulatory commissions is pertinent:
"The chief criticism that can be made of the regulatory commissions is that they become too en-
grossed in case-by-case activities and thus fail to plan their roles and to promote the enterprises entrusted
to their care. Typical of this is the attitude by which the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Interstate
Commerce Commission have approached the problem of building a route structure for the Nation."
REPORT, Op. ct. supra note ii, at 15-16.
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subsidies require reporting of this character, but also it is the sine qua non for inte-
gration of the new cargo carriers into the air transport system and for the evaluation
of each carrier's place in any regulatory design for the industry.
IV
CONCLUSION
The Civil Aeronautics Board recently has been under attack in Congress, 7 in the
courts,'" and in the press.'0 It may well be that revision of CAB statistical pro-
cedures and objectives to recognize the emergence of air cargo and other new factors
in air transportation would gain added and deserved respect for the Board, in spite
of the obvious short-run difficulties in taking such a step.
Revision of statistical procedures would appear to be a condition precedent to the
recognition of new facts in air transport. This change in regulatory approach should
make possible the development of affirmative administrative standards and the re-
jection of ad hoc determinations with their many inconsistencies. Unlike the past,
decisions rendered in this setting would have real value as precedents for future
Board action.2" Such procedures might well serve as an indication to Congress that
monies appropriated for air mail subsidies would be employed in an orderly fashion.
Now that the Board finds itself a party to an increased amount of litigation, it may
find its position enhanced by a more consistent approach to air transportation.
Moreover, reporting changes of the character here discussed would be an additional
step toward making the industry aware of the Board's active responsibilities under
the Civil Aeronautics Act.
" Most important have been the recently completed hearings of the Senate Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce under the chairmanship of Senator Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado. See also
H. R. REP. No. 1958, 8oth Cong., 2d Sess. (1948) passim; H. R. REP. No. 1242, 8oth Cong., 2d Sess.
5 (1948); H. R. REP. No. 2i63, 8oth Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (948); SEN. REP. No. 3189, 8oth Cong., 2d
Sess. 5 (1948).
" Especially by Justice Jackson in the dissenting opinion in Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v.
Civil Aeronautics Board, 336 U. S. 6os (1949).
" Press criticism has come principally from the columnists Marquis Childs, Thomas L. Stokes, and
Drew Pearson, although a few newspapers, particularly The Washington Post, have been critical.
"' In this connection, the survey officer on aviation for the Regulatory Commission Committee of
the Hoover Commission has made this statement:
"It appears that the Board could have done better in adopting general standards to guide it in
handling the many important and novel policy decisions that have come before it. It has been pointed
out that its decisions in individual cases have developed little precedent that either the Board or industry
considers binding. This has made the Board's problem of rendering fair and consistent decisions par-
ticularly difficult." Sweeney, Policy Formation, by the Civil Aeronautics Board, 16 I. AIR L. AND CoM.
127, 159 (1949).
